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NOTES
the work was originally created as a work for hire and that the puta-
tive employer "could have exercised the requisite power to control or
supervise" the author-employee. 13" If a renewal proprietor asserts that
the copyright was renewable under the corporate-body provision, he
faces three tasks. He must-establish that the work was not authored by
one identifiable person. He must show that the persons who com-
posed the work were related to the corporation which obtained origi-
nal copyright, but related in some way other than as employees or
assignors. Furthermore, he must show that their contributions to the
work are merged and "incapable of separate identification." These re-
quirements would seem to foreclose the utilization of the corporate-
body provision as a basis for upholding a renewal for all but an ex-
tremely limited type of work.
ANNE ELIZABETH ROGERS
Securities Law—Insider Liability Under Section 16(b) of The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Whiting v. Dow Chemical
Co. '—In September and October of 1973, Helen Dow Whiting sold
29,770 shares of Dow Chemical Company (Dow), which she had ac-
quired by gift and inheritance. 2 In December of 1973, her husband
Macauley Whiting, a director of Dow, exercised his executive stock
option and purchased 21,420 shares of Dow.' To finance his pur-
chase, Mr. Whiting borrowed some of the funds which Mrs. Whiting
had received from her earlier sales. 4 The sales and purchase were
made pursuant to a joint long-term investment plan which the Whit-
ings had devised with their financial adviser.' Although the Whitings
maintained separate investment accounts," they filed a joint income
tax return and combined their individual funds to meet the family's
living expenses.' Mr. Whiting contributed nearly his entire salary to-
wards those expenses.' Mrs. Whiting contributed an even larger sum,
primarily derived from dividends and capital gains on her Dow
holdings."
When Dow informed Mr. Whiting of its intention to recover the
profits realized as a result of matching Mrs. Whiting's sales with Mr.
134 522 F.2d at 744.
' 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 682. At the time of her sales, Mrs. Whiting owned less than 10% of the
outstanding shares of Dow common. Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp•
1130,1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3 523 F.2d at 682.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 682.
8 Id.
9 1d.
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Whiting's purchase,'" he sought a declaratory judgment in federal dis-
trict court that he was not liable under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934" (the Act) for the alleged short-swing"
profit." Dow counterclaimed in this action for the profit." The dis-
trict court concluded that, despite the fact that Mr. Whiting was not
the owner of the shares sold by Mrs. Whiting, he was nonetheless liable
under section 16(b).' 5
 The cotirt's decision was based on the premise
that since the term "profit realized by him"" in section 16(b) was sus-
ceptible of several interpretations, it should be construed broadly in
order to effectuate the congressional purpose of eliminating short-
swing trading based on inside information.' 7
 This policy, the court
reasoned, demanded attribution of a spouse's transactions to an
insider's if the family situation indicated that the spouse's transactions
could be influenced by insider information." The Whiting's joint fi-
nancial planning and contributions to the family's living expenses in-
dicated to the court not only that the Whitings had a common interest
in mutual prosperity but also that they communicated easily on mat-
is Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130, 1131 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connec-
tion with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any trans-
action where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or
any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regula-
tions may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsec-
tion.
Id.
" Short-swing profits are gains made on a purchase-sale or sale-purchase within
a period of six months. See id.
13 523 F.2d at 682.
" Id.
15
 Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130, 1132, 1138 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
is 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The text of § 16(b) is quoted at note 11 supra.
" 386 F. Supp. at 1136.
is Section 16(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78p(a) (1970), defines an insider as a per-
son owning, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of any equity security which is regis-
tered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 4 78/ (1970), or as an officer or director of
the company. The text of $ 16(a) is quoted at note 46 infra.
'° See 386 F. Supp. at 1137.
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ters related to that prosperity." This type of relationship, the court
concluded, was susceptible to insider abuse.'" Thus, the court attri-
buted Mrs. Whiting's sales to Mr. Whiting and held him accountable
for the profit realized. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed and HELD: Although a husband does not exercise "exclusive"
control over his wife's investments, if he enjoys the benefits of owner-
ship he is the "beneficial owner" of his wife's securities and thus is li-
able for the profit realized as a result of' matching her sales with his
purchase within a six month period. 23 The court reasoned that if the
rewards of a spouse's ownership—income and profit, as well as power
of disposal by gift or at death—are used for the joint benefit of the
spouses, the possibility exists that inside information will be abused."
The Whitings' financial relationship suggested to the court that Mr.
Whiting shared in the rewards of his wife's ownership. Not only did
they jointly contribute to the family's living expenses, but they also
engaged in joint financial planning which had included the ques-
tioned sales and purchase." If liability was not imposed under these
circumstances, the court stated, the door would be open to the very
abuse of inside information which Congress had sought to prevent. 26
The Whiting decision is typical of the traditional pragmatic ap-
proach to section 16(b). 27 This note will examine the Whiling court's
application of that approach to the spousal attribution issue. Although
the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the attribution issue,
it has indicated, particularly in its post-Whiting decision, Fore-
most-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.," a framework for con-
struing 16(b) definitional terms such as "beneficial owner." The viabil-
ity of the Whiting decision will be analyzed in light of the Supreme
Court's analytical scheme, with particular emphasis on the legislative
history of the term "beneficial owner." It will ultimately be submitted
that although the Whiting court's interpretation of that term may be
consistent with section 16(10 remedial' purpose of preventing the un-
fair use of inside information, it is contrary to the legislative history
underlying the term "beneficial owner;" thus, the Whiting court incor-
rectly broadened the scope of section 16(b) by holding a director li-
able for the profit realized on a matching of his purchase with his
spouse's sales.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits
short-swing sales and purchases by corporate insiders." An insider is
"Id. at 1132, 1137.
21 Id. at 1138.
22 1d.
23 523 F.2d at 688-89.
22 Id. at 688.
" Id.
" Id. at 689.
27 See text at notes 31-52 infra.
" 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The text of § 16(b) is quoted at note 11 supra.
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defined as either a director or officer of a corporation or a "beneficial
owner" of at least 10 percent of a registered equity security of a
corporation. 30
 In interpreting this section, the courts traditionally
have followed two approaches. 3 ' The early cases32
 adopted an objec-
tive, mechanical approach. 33
 Under this approach, the definitional
limits of the section were construed broadly in light of the section's
remedial purpose, irrespective of whether Congress intended to pre-
vent the particular type of transaction in question. 34
 If a transaction
fell within the broad definitional limits, liability attached. 35
In response to the harshness and unfairness of the objective
approach," the courts developed what has been labeled a subjective
or pragmatic approach. 37
 A court which adopts this approach analyzes
a transaction in two distinct steps." The first step is similar to the ob-
jective approach inasmuch as the court determines whether the trans-
33 15 U.S.C. g 78p(a) (1970). The text of § I6(a) is quoted at note 46 infra.
31
 Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for Clarifica-
tion, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 772 (1971). For discussion of the two approaches see Hazen,
The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(5) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C.L. REV. I
(1975); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule; The Pragmatic Approach to Section 16(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 221 (1975).
32 See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951); Park & Tilford, Inc.
v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1943).
33
 The objective approach apparently arose out of a statement of Mr. Thomas
Corcoran, a drafter of the Act, that the section was a "crude rule of thumb:"
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell
the security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible
to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to
have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden
of having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get
out on a short swing.
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 7341
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934). Arguably, "crude rule of thumb" can be con-
strued to mean that 16(b) is to be interpreted broadly, as the objective approach does,
without regard to the harshness which might ensue. Wentz, supra note 31, at 231 n.32.
Alternatively, because of the context in which the statement was made, "crude rule of
thumb" may merely have meant that liability is to be imposed regardless of the insider's
intent. Id. Thus, it is suggested that the phrase does not rule out a pragmatic approach
inasmuch as a pragmatic approach does not examine the insider's actual intent. Id. See
also Bateman, supra note 31, at 776 & n.13.
" In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), the court stated:
The statute is broadly remedial.... We must suppose that the statute was
intended to be thorough-going, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock
transactions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any
conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or
stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty.
Id. at 239. See Wentz, supra note 31, at 227-28.
35 Wentz, supra note 31, at 227.
35 Id. at 228.
" See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582,
594 n.26 (1973).
3° Wentz, supra note 31, at 225.
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action is within the section's general definitional boundaries. 3" If the
transaction is within those boundaries, the court then determines
whether the transaction is the type which might lend itself to an abuse
of inside information." Liability will attach only if the response to
both inquiries is affirmative.'"
In Whiting, the Second Circuit appears to have adopted the
pragmatic approach. The court complied with the first step of the ap-
proach when it initially determined that Mrs. Whiting's sales fell
within the section's general definitional boundaries. 42 Noting that sec-
tion 16 does not expressly define an insider to include the spouse of
an insider," the court sought to determine whether the term "benefi-
cial owner" in section 16(b) of the Act required spousal attribution
even though the director did not exercise "exclusive" control over his
spouse's transactions." Fur guidance, the court looked to section
16(a), 45
 which requires an insider to provide the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (the SEC) with an up-to-date listing of the
company's securities "of which he is the beneficial owner."'" The
court noted that "beneficial owner," as used in section 16(a), had been
interpreted in a 1966 SEC release' to require an insider to include in
39 Id.
40 1d.
" See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
" 523 F.2d at 688.
" Id. at 683.
" Id.
45 Id.
40 15 U.S.C. 78p(a) (1970). The subsection provides:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of an equity security (other than an
exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title,
or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at
the time of the registration of such security on a national securities ex-
change or by the effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant
to section 78/(g) of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such ben-
eficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if
such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the
exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he
is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calen-
dar' month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership dur-
ing such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is reg-
istered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange),
a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month
and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar
month.
Id.
" 31 Fed. Reg. 1005 (1966). The release provides:
Generally a person is regarded as the beneficial owner of securities
held in the name of' his or her spouse and their minor children. Absent
special circumstances such relationship ordinarily results in such person
obtaining benefits substantially equivalent to ownership, e.g., application of
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his report to the SEC securities held in the name of a spouse and
minor children. 48 Absent special circumstances which show that a
spouse does not receive "benefits substantially equivalent to owner-
ship," the release creates a presumption that such securities are bene-
ficially owned by the insider. 49 Reading section 16(b) broadly in light
of its remedial purpose, the court infused the term "beneficial owner"
in that section with the spousal attribution concept which the SEC had
applied to the term in section 16(a). 5° This broad construction of the
term brought the Whitings' transactions within section 1 6(b)'s general
definitional boundaries.
Turning then from the first step of the pragmatic approach to the
second, the court determined that the Whitings' relationship did
create the possibility of an abuse of inside information. 5 ' The court
reasoned that their- relationship indicated that Mr. Whiting shared in
the rewards of his spouse's ownership. 52 . Thus, both steps of the
pragmatic approach were satisfied and Mr. Whiting was held liable
for the profit realized as a result of matching his purchase with his
wife's sales.
Other courts have also attributed a spouse's transactions to a di-
rector, but have done so without extensive analysis. In Bershad v.
McDonough:" for example, the Seventh Circuit imputed a spouse's
the income derived from such securities to maintain a common home, to
meet expenses which such person otherwise would meet from other
sources, or the ability to exercise a controlling influence over the purchase,
sale, or voting of such securities. Accordingly, a person ordinarily should
include in his reports filed pursuant to Section I6(a) securities held in the
name of a spouse or minor children as being beneficially owned by him.
A person also may be regarded as the beneficial owner of securities
held in the name of another person, if by reason of any contract, under-
standing, relationship, agreement, or other arrangement, he obtains there-
from benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership. Accordingly,
where such benefits are present such securities should be reported as
being beneficially owned by the reporting person. Moreover, the fact that
the person is a relative or relative of a spouse and sharing the same home
as the reporting person may in itself indicate that the reporting person
would obtain benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership from
securities held in the name of such relative. Thus, absent countervailing
facts, it is expected that securities held by relatives who share the same
home as the reporting person will be reported as being beneficially owned
by such person.
A person also is regarded as the beneficial owner of securities held
in the name of a spouse, minor children or other person, even though he
does not obtain therefrom the aforementioned benefits of ownership, if he
can vest or revest title in himself at once, or at some future time.
Id. at 1006 (footnote omitted).
" Id.
43 See id.
50 See 523 F.2d at 688.
51 Id. at 688-89.
" Id. at 688.
53
 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). See also B.T.
Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1964) (parties stipulated to attribu-
tion).
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purchases and sales to a director without discussion of the attribution
issue." In Blau v. Potter, 55 Schur v. Salzman" and Marquette Cement
Manufacturing Co. v. Andreas," the district courts treated the issue of
attribution as a question of fact. Using the criteria set forth in the
SEC 16(a) release, the Schur court found that there were no special
circumstances which indicated that the director was not the beneficial
owner of his wife's shares." In Blau, on the other hand, the court did
not attribute the wife's purchase to the husband because her assets
were separate, none of her funds were used to defray her own or
family living expenses, and her spouse was unaware of her trading
activity." The Marquette court likewise did not attribute, inasmuch as
the director and his wife were divorced." Thus, the Whiting court is
not alone in considering the attribution of a spouse's transactions to
an insider.
While the Whiting court's result is consistent with decisions
reached by other federal courts, the initial broad reading of the term
"beneficial owner" is inconsistent with the manner in which the Su-
preme Court has construed 16(b)'s definitional terms. Prior to the
Whiting decision, the Supreme Court had considered three 16(b) cases.
These cases did not, however, provide clear guidelines for construing
16(b). In the first and the last of these three cases, Blau v. Lehman"'
and Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 62 respectively,
the Court appeared to adopt a mode of analysis similar to the prag-
matic approach.° 3 On the other hand, in the intervening case of'
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.," the Court adopted essen-
tially an objective approach. 65
 In light of this apparent lack of consis-
tency, it is not surprising that the Whiting court chose to follow the
pragmatic approach, seemingly subscribed to in Kern County.
When these three cases are viewed in conjunction with the
Court's post-Whiting decision, Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Se-
curities Co.," it appears, however, that the Court has adopted a consis-
tent approach. Moreover, this approach does not comport with the
traditional pragmatic approach utilized by the Whiting court. Like the
pragmatic approach, the Court's approach has two steps. The second
step of the Court's approach and the second step of the pragmatic
" 428 F.2d at 695.
" [1973 Transfer Binder] CC14 FED. SEC. L. REP., 94,115, at 94,477 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
66
	F. Supp. 725, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
57 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" 365 F. Supp. at 732.
" [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sec. L. REP. 94,115, at 94,477.
" 239 F. Supp. at 967.
11 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
6s U.S. 582 (1973).
" See Wentz, supra note 31, at 231, 257.
" 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
65 Wentz, supra note 31, at 231.
" 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
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approach are identical inasmuch as they both involve an inquiry into
the possibility of insider abuse. 67 However, the Court's first step de-
parts significantly from the first step of the pragmatic approach.
Rather than initially interpreting I6(b)'s definitional terms in light of
the section's remedial purpose, the Court has chosen to construe the
terms solely in light of their legislative history. 68 If the legislative his-
tory reveals that the term is susceptible to only one construction, an
inquiry into the possibility of abuse is inappropriate." If, on the other
hand, the term is capable of more than one construction, the Court
will resolve the ambiguity in favor of a construction which effectuates
the section's remedial purpose. 7°
In the first case, Blau v. Lehman," the Court was confronted with
the question of whether a partnership could be a "director" for I6(b)
purposes. One of the partners of Lehman Brothers, a New York in-
vestment firm, had become a director of Tide Water Associated Oil
Company. Because the evidence indicated that the partner had not
performed his duties as a director on behalf of the partnership, the
Court refused to treat Lehman Brothers as a director within the
meaning of section 16(b). 72 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that under sections 3(a)(7) 73 and 3(a)(9) 74 of the Act, a partner-
ship can be considered a director if it is demonstrated that the part-
nership, and not the partner, actually functioned as the director. 75
Moreover, in response to the contention that a partnership should be
included because it might be "tipped off" by a partner who was a di-
rector, the Court stated that Congress had rejected an expansion of
16(b) to include tippees. 78 The Court pointed out that a provision in
early drafts of I6(b) which would have held tippees liable had been
"See Kern, 411 U.S. 582, 596-604 (1973).
52 See Provident, 423 U.S. 232, 244 (1976).
°° See Reliance, 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972).
71' See Kern, 411 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1973).
" 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
75 Id. at 410.
75 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1970). The section provides that "[tike term 'director'
means any director of a corporation or any person performing similar functions with
respect to any organization .. ." Id.
74 Id. 78c(a)(9). This section provides that "[t]he term 'person' means an indi-
vidual, a corporation, a partnership ... ." Id.
75 386 U.S. at 409-10. Although the Court did not mention it, 20(a) of the Act,
15 U.S.C. 78t(a) (1970), also appears to provide a basis for holding a partnership li-
able under 16(b). This provision declares that any person directly or indirectly control-
ling an individual subject to the Act is jointly and severally liable with the controlled
person, unless he can demonstrate he acted in good faith and did not directly or indi-
rectly induce the unlawful acts. Id. For a discussion of liability under this section, see
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975); Comment, The
Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV, 1019 (1973).
7° 368 U.S. at 411-12. A "tippee" is an individual to whom material, nonpublic
corporate information has been communicated. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD** 7.5(1), (2), at 190.7 (1975).
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eliminated from the final legislation. 77 Thus, the Court seemed willing
to initially construe 16(b)'s definitional terms in light of the express
definition provided by Congress in other sections of the Act. Absent
evidence of control, however, the Court was unwilling to further con-
strue the meaning of director to include partnerships, despite the fact
that the congressional purpose of preventing abuse of insider infor-
mation would be effectuated by such an expansion.
In the next case, Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.," the
Court construed the Act's requirement that an individual be a 10 per-
cent owner "at the time . of ... sale ..." and again rejected an initial
construction based on the section's remedial purpose." Faced with the
question of whether a shareholder owning 13.2 percent of the out-
standing shares could sell down to 9.96 percent and then sell the re-
mainder without liability,'"! the Court held that the second sale was
exempt." The Court strictly reasoned that the section's literal lan-
guage required that an individual be a 10 percent owner at the Lime
of his sale. Because the defendant owned only 9.96 percent at the
time of his second sale, no liability attached under section 16(b). 82 The
Court also rejected the argument that the section's purpose would be
undermined if this language was not construed to provide an in-
quiry into whether the two sales were part of a single plan of disposal.
The Court stated that such an inquiry would be contrary to Congress'
desire to impose liability without a subjective consideration of the
insider's intent." Thus, as in Blau, the Court refused to base the ini-
tial construction of I6(b)'s terms solely on the section's overall legisla-
tive purpose where the language and legislative history of a specific
term indicated a contrary construction. However, the Reliance Court
did note in dicta that if more than one construction of the term were
possible, the term would be given the construction "that best serves
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by cor-
porate insiders."84 It can be inferred from this statement that the
section's remedial purpose is not to be considered in initially constru-
ing the definitional term. Rather, as both Blau and Reliance indicate,
only the language and legislative history of that specific term are to be
considered in the initial construction. Only if those factors indicate
that more than one construction of the term is possible will the
section's remedial purpose be considered.
in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.," the third
case in the series, the Court for the first time interpreted a 16(b) def-
" 368 U.S. at 412. See note 119 infra.
"404 U.S. 418 (1972).
"Id. at 424-25.
"Id. at 420.
" Id. at 423.
" Id; see 15 U.S.C, § 78p(b) (1970), quoted at note 11 supra.
" 404 U.S. at 424-25. See note 33 supra.
' 4 404 U.S. at 424.
155 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
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initional term in a manner which took account of the susceptibility of
the challenged transaction to insider abuse." The Court was asked to
find that either an exchange of stock pursuant to a merger agreement
or the giving of an option to purchase shares was a "sale" within the
meaning of 16(b). 97 The Court initially inquired into whether the
transaction fell within the section's definition of a "sale."" The Court
concluded that, in light of the definition Congress gave the term in
section 3(a)(14) of the Act," it was broad enough to reach "many
transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale."" Having determined that
the term was susceptible to alternative constructions, the Court then
proceeded to examine whether the transactions were the type which
could lead to an abuse of inside information."' Since the inquiry did
not indicate a possibility of abuse, the Court held that application of
the section to the questioned transactions would not serve its remedial
purpose. 12 Thus, for the first time, the Court considered a transaction
in light of the section's general purpose. This second step in the
Court's analysis was barred in Blau and Reliance because the language
and legislative history of the definitional terms involved in those cases
indicated only one possible construction, which construction put the
transactions beyond the section's reach. In Kern, however, the lan-
guage and legislative history of the term "sale" indicated possible al-
ternative constructions. Therefore, consistent with its dicta in
Reliance, 93 the Court determined whether the section's purpose would
best be served by imposing liability.
In all fairness to the Whiting court, however, it should be noted
that this interpretation of the Blau, Reliance, and Kern County decisions
was not apparent until the Court's post-Whiting decision in
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co. 94 which elucidated the
approach of the earlier decisions. In Provident, the Court followed the
approach it had suggested in the three previous 16(b) cases. Provident
posed the question of whether a single purchase and subsequent sale
of more than 10 percent of a company's stock fell within I6(b). 95 In
resolving this issue, the Court focused on the 16(b) exemptive
provision" which states that 16(b) "shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner [10 percent shareholder] was
not such both at the time of the purchase and sale ...." 97 An analysis
"a Id. at 596.604.
"' Id. at 595-96.
88 Id. at 593-94.
" 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(14) (1970) provides that "Et)he terms 'sale and 'sell' each in-
clude any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
98 411 U.S. at 594.
Id. at 596-604.
"Id. at 597-98, 600, 601.
93 404 U.S. at 424. See text at note 84 supra.
84 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
88 Id. at 235.
"Id. at 245-56.
vr 15 U.S.C. 78p(6) (1970), quoted at note 11 supra.
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of the legislative history and language of this provision indicated to
the Court that it could not be construed to encompass the questioned
transaction, since Congress intended that beneficial owners be liable
only for profits on purchase-sale sequences made subsequent to be-
coming a beneficial owner." Having reached this conclusion, the
Court ended its analysis. Thus, the Court indicated, as it had in the
previous .16(b) cases, that any consideration of the construction which
best serves the congressional purpose is appropriate only if alternative
constructions of the definitional term are available." Since alternative
constructions of the exemptive provision were not possible, the sus-
ceptibility to abuse analysis in which the Kern Court had engaged was
inappropriate.
These four Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court has
not adopted the traditional pragmatic approach to 16(b) followed in
Whiting. Rather than initially construing the section's terms in light of
their particular legislative history, as the Supreme Court has, the
Whiling court ignored the legislative history of "beneficial owner" and
focused solely on the section's general remedial goal."° In light of the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the legislative history of definitional
terms, it appears that the viability of the result in Whiting, as well as
other cases which have attributed a spouse's transactions to a director,
rests squarely on whether an analysis of the legislative history will
support a broad reading of "beneficial owner."
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934"' was Congress' response
to evidence adduced in congressional hearings" 2
 which demon-
strated that uncontrolled market speculation and manipulation, faulty
credit control, investor ignorance and abuses of fiduciary relationships
played a significant role in the 1929 stock market crash and subse-
quent depression.'" Section 16 1 °4 of the Act was designed to protect
the investing public by preventing' directors, officers and large
shareholders from abusing their fiduciary relationships by speculating
on the basis of inside in1 ormation," 5
In 16(a),'" the reporting section, Congress sought both to en-
courage private maintenance of fiduciary standards and to inform in-
vestors of an insider's private opinion of the company's prospects by
9' 423 U.S. at 249.
" 9 See id. at 244.
'°° 523 F.2d at 688.
101 Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § I, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S,C. § 78
(1970).
1 " See generally SENATE: COMM, ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE
PRACHCES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
1 " H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1934).
104 15	 § 78p (1970).
105
 H.R. lity. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). See note 46 supra.
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publicizing any changes in an insider's beneficial ownership.'" In-
deed, the House Report described this section as "the most potent
weapon against the abuse of inside information ...."'" A broad con-
struction of "beneficial owner" in section 16(a) is consistent both with
this purpose and the general language of the section. Unlike 16(b),
which focuses on sales and purchases within a six month period,'"
16(a)'s primary emphasis is on reporting any change in beneficial
ownership. 10 Thus, the 16(a) reports may reveal not only 16(b) viola-
tions but also violations of sections 9" and 10" 2 of the Act. 13
Moreover, the term "beneficial owner" itself apparently was designed
to be broad in the context of' section 16(a). In his testimony before the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Mr. Thomas Corcoran, a
drafter of the Act, stated that "beneficial owner" was the "broadest
term you can have."" 4
This legislative history and language indicates that the SEC's
broad construction of "beneficial owner" in 16(a) is appropriate.'"
This broad interpretation of 16(a) does not, however, provide a basis
for infusing "beneficial owner" in 16(b) with the SEC's interpretation
of that term in 16(a), as the court did in Whiting."S Indeed, the SEC,
recognizing a distinction between 16(a) and 16(b), has stated that its
reporting requirement is not necessarily coextensive with 16(b)
liability."'
The legislative history of spousal attribution under 16(b) does
not provide a basis for the broad interpretation of 'beneficial owner"
within the meaning of that section. Three provisions in the Senate's
draft of the Act bear directly on the question of whether a spouse's
transactions can be imputed to a director for 16(b) purposes.'" Sec-
tion 15(b), the forerunner of section 16(b), contained a provision
which enabled an issuer to recover short-swing profits made by
"" H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 24 (1934).
"° Id.
' 88 See note 11 supra.
" 8 See note 46 supra. See Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 WEST. RES. i.,. REV. 1054, 1063 (1966).
a" 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970). This section regulates manipulation of security prices.
'" Id. § 78j, This section regulates short sales and the use of manipulative and
deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Short sates are
sales "accomplished by selling securities which the seller does not own. Securities are
borrowed for sale with the expectation that the price of the security will decline and a
profit made by repaying the borrowed securities with securities acquired at the lower
price." Feldman Tebeig, supra note 110, at 1062 n.41.
'" Feldman & Teberg, supra note 110, at 1063.
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. an Banking and Cur.
rency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6556 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Stock Exchange
Hearings).
"5 See text at notes 47-49 supra.
18 523 F.2d at 688.
" 7 31 Fed. Reg. 3175, 3176 (1966).
" 8 These provisions were also in the House draft. Compare S. 2693, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. §* 15(b)(3), 19(b), 19(d) (1934), with H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. §* 15(b)(3),
19(b), 19(d) (1934).
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tippees." 9
 Section 19(d) of the draft provided that if a spouse, or any
one of several other enumerated individuals, engaged in a transaction
which, if engaged in by an individual subject to any of the Act's provi-
sions, would be a violation of the Act, the transaction would be im-
puted to that individual.'" This subsection further provided that the
individual would not be found in violation of the Act if he demon-
strated that the transaction was effected neither with his approval nor
for the purpose of evading the Act. 12 ' Finally, section 19(b) of the
draft stated that acts of individuals controlled by persons subject to
the Act were to be imputed to those persons.' 22
" 2
 Section 15(b)(3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), provided that it was
unlawful for an insider:
To disclose, directly or indirectly, any confidential information regarding
or affecting any such registered security not necessary or proper to be dis-
closed as a part of his corporate duties. Any profit made by any person, to
whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any
transaction or transactions in such registered security within a period not
exceeding six months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer unless such person shall have had no reasonable ground
to believe that the disclosure was confidential or was made not in the per-
formance of corporate duties. Such suit may be instituted in law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer or by the owner
of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the
issuer shall fail to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall
fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter. For the purposes of this
subsection the profit shall be calculated on the sale or sales by such person
of such security made at the highest price or prices and on the purchase
or purchases made by such person of such security at the lowest price or
prices during the six-months' period irrespective of the certificates for
such security received or delivered to such person during such period.
' 20
 Section 19(d) of S. 2693, 73d Cong„ 2d Sess. (1934) provided:
If the spouse of a person subject to any provision of this Act or of
any rule or regulation thereunder, or a child or parent residing with such
person, or a person holding in trust for such person money or property
used in the transaction in question shall effect any transaction in a security
which would be a violation of any such provision if effected by such per-
son subject thereto, such person subject thereto shall be deemed to have
violated such provision unless he shall sustain the burden of showing that
the transaction was not effected with his approval or was nat for the pur-
pose of evading such provision.
' 2 ' Id.
"2
 Section 19(b) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any
act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the
provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by
means of any other person who is controlled by such person by or through
stock ownership, agency, or otherwise or through or by means of any
other person who is controlled by such person and one or more other per-
sons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise for the purpose
of avoiding any provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation made
thereunder.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Mr. Corcoran referred to these provisions during his 16(b) tes-
timony:
Senator Carey. Would it be possible for a man to have
several people purchase
	 stock for him?
Mr. Corcoran. There are provisions later to catch his
wife and children, as well as trustees for him. There is also
a provision in the next section to catch those whom he tips
off, and who probably buy for his account, and split the
profit, insofar as they can be caught... . 123
This dialogue demonstrates that the drafters of the Act did not ini-
tially intend that a spouse's transactions be attributed to a director
under 16(b) alone. the than being exposed to automatic liability, 124
a director, under the proposed spousal attribution provision, was to
be given an opportunity to demonstrate that he neither gave his ap-
proval to his spouse's transactions nor intended to evade the Act.' 25
Moreover, if a director made an unlawful disclosure of confidential
information to his spouse, the spouse, and not the director, would be
held liable under the tippee provision for the profit.'" However, if it
could be established that a director actually or legally controlled his
spouse's transactions,'" section 19(b) would allow those transactions to
be imputed to him for purposes of establishing 16(b) liability.'"
The controlled person provision—section 19(b)—was retained in
the final legislation.'" Thus, there is a sound legislative basis for at-
195
 Stock Exchange Hearings, supra note 114, 6558.
1Y4 Section 16(b) liability is imposed irrespective of the insider's intent. See note
33 supra.
1!5
 See note 120 supra. In his testimony, Corcoran stated that this section in effect
provides that "if the wife of a director sells short the stock of her husband's company
. he has the burden of proof that the transaction was not done with his approval, nor
for the purpose of enabling him to evade the prohibition against his selling stock
short." Stock Exchange Hearings, .supra note 114, at 6571.
195
 See note 119 supra.
1!7
 The presence of §§ 19(b) and (d) in the same draft suggests that 19(b) referred
to either actual or legally enforceable control and not control by means of a family rela-
tionship. Indeed, the final House Report stated that control includes actual as well as
"legally enforceable control." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
"m. See note 122 supra.
1Y9
 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1970). This section provides that lilt shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for
such person to do under the provisions of this tide or any rule or regulation there-
under through or by means of any other person." Id. Subsection (b) differs from sub-
section (a), 15 U.S.C. 78t(a) (1970), discussed at note 75 supra, which applies to per-
sons controlling an individual subject to the Act. Subsection (b) imputes to an individual
subject to the Act transactions by individuals whom he controls. Moreover, unlike subsec-
tion (a), this subsection provides neither a good faith nor a not induce" defense.
Nevertheless, it appears that before subsection (b) can be invoked there must be evi-
dence that the insider knowingly used the controlled person., See SEC v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). The purpose of these
two provisions is to prevent evasion of the Act through surrogates. Stock Exchange Hear-
ings, supra note 114, at 6571. Unlike the earlier drafts, however, the section as enacted
does not have examples of control because Congress thought it difficult, if not impossi-
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tributing a spouse's transaction to a director if it is established that the
spouse is the director's alter ego. However, Mr. Whiting neither actu-
ally nor legally controlled Mrs. Whiting's investment decisions. 13 ° In ,
deed, the district court specifically found that "there is no evidence
that he [Mr. Whiting] controls her [Mrs. Whiting's] decisions concern-
ing even the general aspects of her management of her estate."'"
Therefore, only the tippee or the spousal attribution provisions in the
early Senate drafts would have provided a basis for imputing Mrs.
Whiting's sales to Mr. Whiting.
The 15(b) tippet! provision was deleted from the final legislation,
apparently because of anticipated problems in administration.'" Sec-
tion 19(d), which provided for spousal attribution, was also
eliminated.' 33 Although this latter provision was criticized during the
Senate hearings, 134 the reasons for its exclusion are unclear. The pro-
vision created a rebuttable presumption that if any of the enumerated
persons engaged in a transaction which an individual subject to the
Act could not legally accomplish, that individual would be held
liable."' Thus, the provision was in effect a broad amendment to
every other provision of the Act. The thrust of the criticism appears
to have centered on this far-reaching effect. One senator expressed
concern that the provision might prevent a son who was living with
his father from becoming a broker if ,his father were an underwriter
or dealer. 136 One witness viewed the enumerated persons as indepen-
dent and expressed concern that their inadvertent acts might cause
criminal penalties to be imposed on an individual subject to the
Act."' Moreover, the provision was specifically criticized for including
wives in the list of persons whose actions could be imputed:
[S]o far as wives are concerned, the provision is a departure
from the principle of the married women's separate prop-
erty acts and the whole course of legislation in favor of
equal rights for women, which has been the distinguishing
mark for the last quarter century. 138
Although the criticisms of the I9(d) attribution provision do not
clearly suggest the basis for its deletion, they do suggest that the pro-
vision was regarded as too far-reaching—either to the extent of apply-
ble, to define the many ways in which actual control might be exerted. See H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
1" Whiting, 523 F.2d at 685.
'" 386 F. Supp. at 1132.
1" See Stock Exchange Hearings, supra note 114, at 6560-61; Blau, 368 U.S. 403,
412 n. I2 (1962).
1 " Compare S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 19 (1934), with S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 20 (1934).
134 Stock Exchange Hearings, supra note 114, at 6572-73, 6639, 7022.
1311 See note 120 supra.
1 "Stack Exchange Hearings, supra note 114, at 6572-73 (remarks of Senator Kean).
' 31 1d. at 6639.
"8 1d. at 7022.
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ing to every provision of the Act or in the operation of the attribution
concept itself. Thus, unless section 16(b) was modified after this pro-
vision was eliminated, it appears unlikely that when Congress deleted
the provision it intended that the spousal attribution concept was to
be incorporated into that section.
A comparison of the language of 16(b) before and after the de-
letion of the 19(d) spousal attribution provision indicates that 16(b)
was not modified to impute a spouse's transactions to an insider. Sec-
tion 19(d) did not provide for attribution if the insider could demon-
strate that the transaction was not effected either with his approval or
for the purpose of evading the Act. 133
 At the time this section was de-
leted, 16(b) imposed absolute liability.'" This liability standard was
not modified after section I9(d) was deleted."' Thus, it appears that
I9(d)'s defenses were not incorporated into 16(b). To read 16(b) as
incorporating 19(d)'s spousal attribution concept would amount to a
conclusion that 19(d) was rejected because it was too lenient. This is
true because the liability would remain under 16(b) while the defense
would be eliminated. As previously indicated, however, the criticisms
of section 19(d) indicate that it was rejected because it was too harsh.
In addition, at the time of the deletion of the attribution provi-
sion, I6(b) provided that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any director, of-
ficer, or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or beneficially
more than 5 per centum of any class of stock of any issuer, ..." to
purchase and sell any security of the issuer within six months. 142 The
final version of 16(b) states that "[for the purpose of preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such
beneficial owner, director, or officer" any profit realized on a short-
swing trade shall inure to the issuer. 143 It appears that "such beneficial
owner" was substituted in the final version for the original phrase
"owner of securities, owning as of record and/or beneficially more
than 5 per centum of any class of stock of any issuer." This language
change 'indicates that "beneficial owner" was not intended to incorpo-
rate the attribution concept into 16(b). 144 Rather, the phrase "benefi-
132 See note 120 supra.
140
 See note 33 supra.
14 ' Compare S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b)(1) (1934), with S. 3420, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. § I6(b) (1934); cf. Reliance, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1972).
"2
 S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934).
13
 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1970), quoted at note 11 supra.
144
 The phrase "director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record
and/or benefiCially more than 5 per centum" of any class of stock of any issuer was
common to both §§ 15(a) and 15(b) of the Senate draft. See S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
§¢ 15(a), (b) (1934). In the final version of § 15(a) the phrase was changed to leivery
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of
any class of any equity security .. or who is a director or officer ...." 15 U.S.C.
78p(a) (1970). The change in subsection (a) was designed to clarify an error in
draftsmanship. As originally drafted, the "owning" phrase could have been construed
so as to apply to directors and officers as well as shareholders. However, Corcoran
clearly established in his testimony that the "owning" phrase applied only to share-
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cial owner" is synonymous with the phrase "beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any [registered security]," as finally enacted in
section 16(a). 145
If the language changes were in fact intended to incorporate the
attribution concept into 16(b), the language chosen does not clearly
evidence that intent. As the Supreme Court in Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
v. Provident Securities Co.'" stated: "It is inappropriate to reach the
harsh result of imposing § 16(b)'s liability without fault on the basis of
unclear language."'" Thus, it seems unlikely that the Court would in-
terpret the changes in 16(b)'s language to encompass spousal attribu-
tion. It is submitted, therefore, that the legislative history of "benefi-
cial owner" does not provide a basis for the Whiting court's broad con-
struction of that term.'" Rather, the legislative history suggests that
holders. See Stock Exchange Hearings, supra note 114, at 6555. See also Hearings on H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. l33 (1934). Since the original phrases were identical, it is not unlikely that the
change in 15(b) was designed to achieve the same purpose.
"5 See 15 U.S.C. 78p(a) (1970), quoted at note 46 supra. One additional change
was made to I6(b) after the 19(d) attribution and 16(b) tippee provisions were deleted.
A provision was added to both the Senate and House versions of I6(b) which stated
that the subsection was not to be construed to cover transactions which the SEC by rules
and regulations might exempt as not comprehended within the subsection's purpose.
See S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § I6(b) (1934):' H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b)
(1934). This provision was retained in the final legislation. See 15 U.S.C. 78p(b)
(1970), quoted at note 11 supra. While giving the SEC exemptive power, however, Con-
gress does not appear to have given the Commission the inclusive authority to attribute
spousal transactions to I6(b) insiders. In contrast to § 10(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1970), which grants the SEC broad power to make whatever rules and regula-
tions are necessary or appropriate to achieve I0(b)'s purpose of preventing the use of
manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity, see id., § 16(b) grants only the power to exempt. Thus, while § 10(b) gives the
SEC the power to specifically proscribe those activities which fall within its general pro-
hibition, § 16(b) limits Commission power to excluding transactions from its specific
proscriptions when those transactions involve no insider abuse. It thus appears that if
Congress intended that the SEC exercise under § 16(b) the broad power to add to the
list of congressionally proscribed transactions, the phraseology used to grant the
rulemaking power would have been similar or identical to that used in § 10(b). Thus,
the Commission has no power to incorporate spousal attribution into 16(b).
' 4°423 U.S. 232 (1976).
'" Id. at 252.
14 '1 It also appears that the phrase "profit realized by him," 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970), on which the district court relied, see text at note 16 supra, cannot be construed
to require the attribution of spousal transactions. The deleted spousal attribution provi-
sion originally was intended to encompass those transactions. See text at notes 120.22
supra. At the time of its deletion, the relevant section of I6(b) stated that "any profit
made by such person [an insider] ... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer." S.
2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1500) (1934). As finally enacted, this phrase reads "profit
realized by him." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). It appears that this change in phraseology
did not expand the term's meaning to require spousal attribution. Rather, the term ap-
pears to be no more than a simple statement of the amount of damages recoverable by
the issuer. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231. 237-39 (2d Cir. 1943).
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the term is to be narrowly construed to mean only a 10 percent
shareholder.'"
While the legislative history of section 16(b) militates against im-
puting spousal transactions to an insider, the Whiting court's conclu-
sion that the policy goals of the 1934 Act would be thwarted absent
attribution is understandable. The underlying assumption of 16(b) is
that unless absolute liability is imposed on short-swing trading by in-
siders, the Act's goal of maintaining free and honest markets will be
threatened by insiders exploiting their access to nonpublic corporate
information to reap personal benefit.' 5 ° If 16(b) is construed to ex-
clude spousal attribution where there is no evidence of actual insider
control of the spouse's transactions, it appears that the Act's goal may
be thwarted. As the Whiting district court so accurately observed, "the
usual family unit shares the prosperity and the adversity of its mem-
bers, and communicates concerning matters of common concern." 151
Thus, the possibility exists, as both the Whiting district and circuit
courts recognized,'" that if an insider shares in the economic benefits
of his spouse's ownership, he might communicate inside information
to his spouse who will then trade on the basis of that information.
Therefore, the overriding policy of 16(b) and the nature of the famil-
ial relationship provide strong support for spousal attribution.
Indeed, it may be contended solely on the basis of policy, that
the Whiting courts did not go far enough. The "economic benefits"
test fails to recognize that the possibility of insider abuse exists in
every spousal relationship. "[Clommon financial interests ... exist ir-
respective of the precise use of the proceeds " of a spouse's
securities.' 53 For example, if an insider knew that failure to communi-
cate confidential information to his spouse would result in severe loss-
es, it appears likely that his concern for his spouse's financial well-
being would lead him to ignore his Fiduciary obligations.'" Moreover,
the possibility of such abuse would be even greater if his spouse's in-
vestments were to be used to meet a moral or social obligation to
adult children or aging parents' 55 or if the insider knew that he might
inherit his spouse's investments. Likewise, the mere knowledge that
his spouse's investments are available to cushion his personal
economic disasters creates a possibility of abuse of inside information.
It seems likely, therefore, that an insider would be tempted to corn-
"'See Foremost-McKesson, Inc, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. at 249-50.
The Court in Provident also interpreted "such beneficial owner" in § 16(b)'s exemptive
provision as applying only to 10% shareholders and not directors or officers. Id. at 245.
15 ° See Provident, 423 U.S. 232. 243-44 (1976); Kern, 411 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1973);
Reliance, 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
151 386 F. Supp. at 1137.
1 " 523 F.2d at 688-89; 386 F. Supp. at 1136-37.
165 Feldman & Teberg, supra note 110, at 1069.
' 5' See Shreve, Beneficial Ownership of Securities Held by Family Members, 22 Bus.
LAW. 431, 434 (1967).
"5 See Feldman & Teberg, supra note 110, at 1069.
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municate inside information to a spouse whether or not the insider
currently shares in the economic benefits of ownership. Thus, if the
legislative history of "beneficial owner" could be ignored and the Act's
goal of free and fair markets were the sole consideration, all spousal
transactions would be attributed to an insider for 16(b) purposes.
Under the analytical framework designed by the Supreme Court,
however, this legislative history cannot be ignored. The legislative his-
tory of both the "beneficial owner" and the "profit realized by him"
provisions indicates that spousal attribution should not be used to
create 16(b) liability in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the
spouse is the director's alter ego. This interpretation is subject to the
criticism that it will allow escape in situations where there is a great
likelihood of insider abuse. However, in light of the catch-all sanctions
of Rule 10b-5,' 56 the escape may be illusory.
Although the Supreme Court in Provident stated that I6(b)'s
scope is not affected by whether alternative sanctions might prevent
insider abuse, 157 the Court concurrently recognized that Congress has
left some problems of insider abuse to other remedies, thereby
"alleviat[ing] concern that ordinary investors are unprotected against
actual abuses of inside information in transactions not covered by
§ 16(b)." 15" Indeed, the Court noted that section 10(b) and Rule 106-5
might provide a basis for redressing the abuses which Foremost had
argued would ensue from a broad interpretation of I6(b)'s exemptive
provision.'''" Thus, it can be inferred from the Court's statements in
Provident that while the absence of alternative sanctions will not provide
a basis for spousal attribution under 16(b), where, as in the case of
spousal attribution, the legislative history of 16(b) does not clearly es-
tablish liability, the availability of an alternative remedy will buttress
the conclusion that Congress left that particular problem of insider
abuse to other sanctions.
The availability of Rule l Ob-5 to redress spousal abuse of inside
information suggests that the escape created by failing to include
spousal transactions under 16(b) is more apparent than real. If an in-
sider communicated nonpublic corporate information to his spouse,
he would be considered a "tipper" and his spouse a "tippee" for pur-
155 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). This Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of businesS which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
'" 423 U.S. at 255.
11313 hi .
169 1d. at 255 n.29.
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poses of Rule 10b-5. Tippees who have traded on the basis of infor-
mation not generally known have been held subject to the Rule's
sanctions.'" Moreover, insiders who have communicated material"'
nonpublic information to tippees have also been found liable under
the Rule. 182 To hold a tippee and a tipper subject to the sanctions of
Rule 10b-5, it must be established that the communication occurred
and that the recipient had reason to know that the information re-
ceived was material and nonpublic.'" Whether a tippee has reason to
know that the information received is material and nonpublic can be
inferred from the circumstances.'" Likewise, the communication itself
can be inferred. 165
The most significant difference between section 16(b) and Rule
10b-5 is the burden of proof necessary to establish the respective vio-
lations. Section 16(b) imposes absolute liability without regard to proof
of actual abuse or intent. 106 Rule 10b-5, on the other hand, requires
proof, of actual use or abuse of inside information." 7 Inasmuch as the
deleted spousal attribution provision did not impose absolute liability,
it would not seem unreasonable to impose the Rule's proof require-
ments on spousal transactions.
It is submitted that under the proof of abuse standard, Mr.
Whiting as a tipper, and Mrs. Whiting as a tippee, might have been
held liable under Rule lOb-5, if material information was corrimuni-
cated. The type of financial relationship which the Whitings had es-
tablished would be strong circumstantial evidence that Mr. Whiting
communicated information to his wife which she knew was material
and nonpublic.'" Thus, the very type of relationship which the
"11 ° See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); In re Investors Management Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 178,163 (SEC 1971); cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
16 ' The Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), defined material information as facts which af-
fect the desire of an, investor to buy, sell or hold. 401 F.2d at 849.
"I See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
[1970-71 Transfer Binder], CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 193,004 (D. Cob. 1971).
163 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237-38 (2d Cir. 1974).
'"See In re Investors Management Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED,
SEC. L. REP. 178,163, at 80,520-22 (SEC 1971).
l" See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 405, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
166 See notes 11 & 33 supra.
'IT See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Sc Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
235-36 (2d Cir. 1974).
165 See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Ross, the court im-
posed Rule 10b•5 sanctions on three dentists for trading either as insiders or tippees.
The court based its decision on an analyais of the dentists' relationship to the corpora-
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Whiting court used to impose 16(h) liability on Mr. Whiting could also
be the basis for imposing Rule 10b-5 liability on either or both of the
Whitings.'"
CONCLUSION
Although the Whiting decision may effectuate section I 6(b)'s
congressionally declared purpose of preventing the unfair use of in-
side information, the Supreme Court has indicated that this policy is
to be considered only if alternative constructions of the section are
possible. Whether alternative constructions arc possible is to be de-
termined by the language and legislative history of the definitional
term which brings the transaction within the section's proscriptive
boundaries. The language and legislative history of "beneficial owner"
in section 16(b) militate against the Second Circuit's broad interpreta-
tion of that term. In light of' the Supreme Court's seemingly narrow
approach to construing the section's definitional terms, it appears that
the Second Circuit has incorrectly imposed 16(b)'s harsh proscription.
Congress did not intend to incorporate into 16(b) spousal attribution
in the absence of evidence that the director controls his spouse's
transactions. Moreover, the availability of Rule 10b-5 will prevent
frustration of the Act's general goals in those situations where abuse
actually occurs.
ANN E. WEIGEL
non. One of the dentists was a member of the family which controlled the corporation
and was in close touch with his brothers who ran the corporation. The other two den-
tists were long-standing, dose friends of the insider brothers, Moreover, the three den-
tists were friends and had combined to loan money to the corporation in the past.
These facts suggested to the court that all three had access to inside information which
should not be used for personal benefit. Id. at 409-10. Like the three dentists in Ross,
Mrs. Whiting has a close, if not closer relationship, to an insider, her husband. The na-
ture of this relationship when combined with Mr. Whiting's relationship to the corpora-
tion could thus support an inference of actual communication as well as abuse of inside
information.
1 ° 9
 While an issuer could not recover under Rule 106-5 unless he was a pur-
chaser or seller, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975),
he might be able to recover under state law. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); cf: Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1
Cal.3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969). The Court of Appeals of New York,
for example, has held that the use of inside information by corporate officers or di-
rectors to obtain trading profits is a breach of their fiduciary duty which entities the
corporate shareholders to recover on behalf of the corporation. Diamond v. Oreamuno,
24 N.Y.2d at 501, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84. If the insider or his spouse
feared liability at both the state and federal levels, the proper course of action would be
to interplead in the initial action all possible claimants. See id. at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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